

Biljana Meiske

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Research Fields: Experimental Economics, Political Economics, Applied Microeconomics

Research topics: Migration, Discrimination, Status, Conflict behavior

Academic Appointment

- Sept. 2023 - **Max Weber Fellow in Economics,**
European University Institute, Florence
- 2022-2023 **Post-doctoral Researcher,**
Institute of Cognitive Sciences and Technologies (ISTC)
of the National Research Council of Italy (CNR), Rome
- 2017-2022 **Junior Researcher**
Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance, Munich

Education

- 2017-2022 **PhD in Economics,**
Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich &
Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance
- 2011-2014 **Master of Science in Economics and Business
Administration, Banking and Finance,**
University of Zurich, Switzerland
- 2007-2011 **Graduate Engineer of Organizational Sciences,**
Faculty of Organizational Sciences,
University of Belgrade, Serbia
- 2010-2011 Join EU See - Int. Exchange program: University of Turku, Finland

References

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Kai Konrad

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Florian Englmaier

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Working Papers

Queen Bee Immigrant: The Effects of Status Perceptions on Immigration Attitudes

*Best paper award at the 8th Young Economists' Meeting, Brno (2023)

This work studies the dynamics of inter-minority relations and attempts to uncover the influence of the status position of established immigrants on their attitudes towards new waves of immigration. I hypothesize that relative status deprivation, that is, the degree to which own in-group is ranked low in the ethnic status hierarchy of the host country, has a negative impact on group members' attitudes toward an even lower-ranked status group. In an online experiment (N=1,159), participants with immigration background residing in Germany randomly receive either a positive or a negative evaluation of their own ethnic/national in-group, as evaluated by a group of ethnic German participants, while keeping constant the evaluations of other immigrant groups. The results show that participants whose in-group received a negative evaluation are systematically less willing to donate to an organization supporting refugees and express more negative views of the refugees from the Middle East. Furthermore, it is shown that participants who received a negative evaluation of their own in-group expect the native majority participants to express significantly more critical views of the refugees (and other low-status out-groups), indicating that the treatment effect on behavior could be moderated by its effect on perceived norms surrounding prejudice expression. Finally, the results show that treatment affects not only the privately held attitudes towards refugees but also participants' willingness to publicly express them, as participants who received a negative evaluation of their in-group more readily express their (critical) preferences when under observation of the participants from the native majority.

The Influence Premium of Monetary Rank (with Andrea F. M. Martinangeli)

Hierarchical relationships between two individuals have been shown to activate systematic behavioral, psychological, attitudinal and neurological responses in the subordinate pushing the latter to adapt their behavior to those of higher ranked others. We investigate whether monetary rank, defined exclusively in terms of the amount of resources held by an individual, grants greater direct influence over others' choices. Investment choices of a representative sample of the German population are influenced more by individuals with a high (vs low) monetary rank commonly known to be of random origin.

Corrective Behavior in Social Media and the Development of Correction Norm (with Amalia Alvarez, Giulia Andrighetto and Eugenia Polizzi) – revise and resubmit

Corrective comments, posted in response to observing shared false content in social networks, not only have been shown to be effective in reducing belief in the posted misinformation among those who observe the online interaction (Badrinathan & Chauchard (2022), Kluck et al. (2019), Bode & Varga (2018)), but also serve as a publicly visible punishment of violation against the norm of sharing only the content of reliable accuracy. By visibly displaying punishing behavior, corrective comments have the potential to function as a norm-nudge, both on the level of the target behavior (sharing false content), as well as on the level of the punishing behavior (responding by a corrective comment). We run an online experiment where participants observe an interaction reminiscent of an online discussion forum - an initial post (potentially containing false information) is followed by a line of comments - and ask the participants to join the discussion by leaving their own comment. We vary the number of corrective comments (those that explicitly dispute the accuracy of the post) following a false information post that participants observe and measure the effect of this variation on participants' propensity to themselves engage in corrective behavior (both in the given situation, as well as, when subsequently encountering another false-content post absent any observable corrections). Furthermore, we examine whether variation in observed correction has an impact on participants' normative and empirical expectations regarding both sharing false content in social networks and engaging in corrective behavior.

Productivity Shocks and Conflict: The Role of Loss Aversion

This paper studies the consequences of productivity shocks on conflict behavior in the presence of loss aversion. In a

first step, I incorporate expectation-based loss preferences ala Kőszegi and Rabin (2006, 2007) into a Hirshleifer-Skaperdas conflict game and show that negative productivity shocks entail higher conflict investments if agents are loss averse (and lower investments if agents are gain-seeking); the reverse holds in case of a positive productivity shock. In a second step, a lab experiment (N=496) was conducted with participants playing repeated guns-and-butter conflict game under changing productivity regimes. The experimental results reveal that while adverse productivity shocks (channeled through loss aversion) have the predicted effects, positive productivity shocks lead to the predicted increase in conflict investment among gain-seeking but fail to reduce conflict investment among loss-averse participants. Furthermore, absent any changes in productivity level, conflict investments are shown to increase in the level of loss aversion.

Work in progress

Wins and Losses in Collective Actions: Evidence from the field (with Raisa Sherif)

Global warming, deforestation, destruction of wildlife, etc. - all represent problems which require coordination on a global level to be successfully resolved. At the same time, they also have their representation on a smaller scale (e.g., on a local level). We study, using a field experiment, whether the experience of participation in a small-scale collective action affects the willingness to contribute in a related but larger collective action. Particularly, we are interested in the motivational and demotivational effects of having achieved a "small win" or having failed to do so, on scaling-up the collective effort, and the relative magnitude of these effects. Furthermore, we investigate whether success (failure) in the smaller scale collective action has heterogeneous effects on participants with different initial propensity to contribute.

Presentations

8th Young Economists' Meeting, Brno (2023); 12th ifo Dresden Workshop on Labor Economics and Social Policy, Dresden (2023); Seventh International Meeting on Experimental and Behavioral Social Sciences (IMEBESS), Lisbon (2023); 9th Meeting of the Behavioral and Experimental Economics Network (BEEN), Venice (2023); Workshop on Online Social Influence, UCD Behavioural Science and Policy Group and the Stirling Behavioural Science Centre, Dublin (2022); Research seminar at Laboratory of Agent Based Social Simulation (LABBS) at National Research Council of Italy (2022); ESA Global Online Around-the-Clock Meetings (2021); 11th International Conference of the French Association of Experimental Economics (ASFEE) (2021); CRC Summer School 2021: Science-Based Policy Advice (2021); Behavioral Brown Bag Seminar LMU Munich (2019)

Experience

2016-2017	Teaching Assistant at Nuremberg Institute of Technology, Subjects: Microeconomics, Econometrics
2015-2016	Consultant at PwC Financial Services - Asset Management, Munich
2015 Apr-Jun	Internship in Portfolio Management/Structured Investment Management, "Assenagon", Munich
2014 Aug-Nov	Internship in Asset Management at "quirin bank", Berlin
2014 Jul-Aug	Research Assistant at Department for Behavioral Finance, University of Zurich
2012 Jul-Aug	Research Assistant at Department for Behavioral Finance, University of Zurich

Awards and Scholarships

2011-2012	Awarded governmental scholarship “Dositeja”
2011	Awarded “Student of Generation”, Faculty of Organizational Sciences, University of Belgrade
2008-2011	Awarded governmental scholarships “Dositeja” for the outstanding academic results
2008-2011	Awarded scholarship “Fond Dr. Srejšović” for academic excellence

Languages

• Serbo-Croatian	Native
• English	Fluent
• German	Fluent
• Spanish	Intermediate
• Italian	Intermediate

Technical skills

- STATA, MATLAB, VBA
- Z-tree, O-tree, Qualtrics

Extracurricular activities

2023-	Volunteering for “Malengo” as a mentor for bachelor students from Uganda studying in Germany
2018-2022	Refugee Assistance – Volunteering for “Bellevue di Monaco”, refugee assistance and culture center – teaching mathematics and German for school attending refugees

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